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Abstract—We compare two Demand Side Management (DSM)
mechanisms, introduced respectively by Mohsenian-Rad et al
(2010) and Baharlouei et al (2012), in terms of efficiency and
fairness. Each mechanism defines a game where the consumers
optimize their flexible consumption to reduce their electricity
bills. Mohsenian-Rad et al propose a daily mechanism for which
they prove the social optimality. Baharlouei et al propose a hourly
billing mechanism for which we give theoretical results: we prove
the uniqueness of an equilibrium in the associated game and give
an upper bound on its price of anarchy. We evaluate numerically
the two mechanisms, using real consumption data from Pecan
Street Inc. The simulations show that the equilibrium reached
with the hourly mechanism is socially optimal up to 0.1%, and
that it achieves an important fairness property according to a
quantitative indicator we define. We observe that the two DSM
mechanisms avoid the synchronization effect induced by non-
game theoretic mechanisms, e.g. Peak/OffPeak hours contracts.
Index Terms—Smart Grids, Demand Response, Dynamic Pric-
ing, Game Theory, Equilibrium, Price of Anarchy, Fairness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand Side Management (DSM) is a way to exploit
demand elasticity to achieve energy balancing or ancillary
services [1]. It has become an increasing issue for electrical
systems with the new possibilities offered by smart grid
technologies. Such flexibilities can be an efficient way of
reducing peak electricity demand. These opportunities could
enable to avoid using expensive flexible power plants, with
high variational costs and important air emissions. Besides,
with an increasing part of fluctuating renewable production
sources, flexibilities will be crucial to ensure the network
reliability. Thus, DSM could provide significant economic,
reliability and environmental benefits.
Demand Response has been the subject of a blooming
literature in the past decade. One can refer to [2], [3] and [1]
for surveys on this topic. Several works [4], [5], [6],[7] propose
game theory frameworks and dynamic pricing models that
enable users to schedule their flexible electricity consumption.
In this paper, we consider the framework proposed by
Mohsenian-Rad et al (2010) [4]. An isolated operator hold-
ing power production assets proposes to equip each of its
consumers with an automatic Energy Consumption Scheduler
(ECS), integrated inside a smart meter. This ECS is connected
both to the power grid and to flexible electrical appliances
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such as plug-in electric vehicles, air conditioning, heating, etc.
Every day, each ECS runs locally an algorithm to schedule
the local consumption for each hour of the next day. This
scheduling aims to minimize the total energy cost for the
system while respecting the quality of service and constraints
for each flexible appliance. Each consumer pays a part of
the total generation cost proportional to the energy it has
consumed in the day. Technically, the distributed algorithm
consists in implementing a Best Response Dynamic: each
ECS iteratively minimizes its individual bill, parametrized
by its information on the total load of the system. Then, it
communicates to the system its individual optimal load. The
system updates the current total load and informs all ECSs.
The implementation of a DSM mechanism raises several
difficulties. Owing to the huge number of variables and
constraints and to the impossibility for an aggregator to collect
all the consumption constraints because of privacy concerns,
the optimization has to rely on a decentralized algorithm that
minimizes the information exchanged with the users. Obvi-
ously, efficiency is also a desirable property. One wishes that,
as in [4], the scheduling process leads to an optimal or close
to optimal consumption profile for the global system costs,
while respecting all the users constraints. Another important
feature, more discussed in [8], is fairness: the payment model
should penalize consumers imposing costly constraints for the
system, while rewarding flexible ones. This point is essential
to ensure the acceptability of the process and encourage
users to stay in a DSM program. Besides, this feature has a
merit in terms of incentives. Indeed, such fair billing models
would encourage consumers to modify their constraints so that
available flexibility for the system increases.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we give
new theoretical results associated with the hourly billing mech-
anism [8] by proving the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium,
and by specifying an explicit upper bound on its price of anar-
chy. Next, we present numerical results, based on simulations
using real consumption data, that compare the two billing
mechanisms [4] and [8] in terms of efficiency and fairness.
The results show that the hourly mechanism achieves a very
small price of anarchy and an important fairness property.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce
the consumption game model. In Section III we recall some
notions from game theory and define quantitative indicators
to measure the efficiency and the fairness of a given billing
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mechanism. In Section IV we introduce the daily proportional
billing considered in [4] and recall its main properties. In Sec-
tion V, we focus on the hourly proportional billing proposed in
[8] and present our new theoretical results. Last, Section VI is
devoted to numerical experiments, based on real consumption
data, from which we compare the fairness and efficiency of
the two different billing mechanisms.
II. ENERGY CONSUMPTION GAME
We consider an autonomous network composed of a unique
electricity provider and a set N of N electricity consumers.
We use a model similar to Mohsenian-Rad et al [4].
A. Consumers constraints
Each user n has a set of electric appliances An. For each
a ∈ An, this user (himself or through an ECS) can set the
power xhna allowed to a at each time period h in Hna =
{αna, . . . , βna} ⊂ H, where H is the set of time periods
considered over a day. We consider the following constraints:∑
h∈H
xhna = Ena, ∀a ∈ An , (1a)
xhna 6 xhna 6 xhna, ∀a ∈ An,∀h ∈ H . (1b)
Each electric appliance a ∈ An requires a fixed daily amount
of energy (1a). Due to physical limits, the power set to
appliance a is bounded from below and above (1b). If the
appliance a can not be used in the time period h, we set
xhna = x
h
na = 0. The set of available time periods for a ∈ An
is therefore given by Hna = {h : xhna > 0}.
We will denote more compactly by Xn the set of feasible
loads (xhna)h,a that respect the constraints given by (1).
B. System cost functions
We denote by Ch(`h) the system costs for providing to
users the total load `h :=
∑
a,n x
h
na at time h. It is widely
accepted that marginal production costs increase with demand.
Hence we assume that cost functions Ch(.) are increasing
and strictly convex [4]. These functions can depend on the
period h as it is more expensive to produce energy on peak
hours or for instance, when the renewable production is low.
Practically, in our model, (Ch)h∈H can be the actual costs
for the provider but can also be an artificial signal that is
sent to each user’s ECS in order to make him perform a
decentralized optimization of his consumption. We will mostly
consider quadratic cost functions as done in [4]:
Ch(`
h) = ah2 (`
h)
2
+ ah1`
h + ah0 . (2)
We assume for simplicity that the total system cost, denoted
by C :=∑h Ch is divided among consumers, in a way defined
by the provider. If we denote by bn the bill paid by user n for
the day, then we have C =∑n bn. In general, bn can depend
on the induced costs (Ch)h and the load vector of each user
(`hn)n,h, where `
h
n :=
∑
a x
h
na. In this work we are interested
in two different billing models given in Sections IV and V.
Finally, each user will try to minimize his bill bn while
respecting his constraints (1), by solving the problem:
min
xn∈Xn
bn(xn,x−n) (3)
where xn := (xhna)h,a and x−n = (xm)m 6=n stands for the
consumption vector of all users but n. As bn depends on both
xn and x−n, this problem can be stated in the framework of
game theory. We refer the reader to [9] for background. With
N denoting the set of players, X :=∏n∈N Xn the set of pure
strategies and (bn)n the vector of bills, the game is formulated
under normal form G = (N ,X , (bn)n).
III. MEASURING EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS
A. Efficiency and the Price of Anarchy
We define the social cost of a load solution x = (xn)n∈N
as the sum of the bills in the population, that is:
SC(x) :=
∑
n∈N
bn(xn,x−n) . (4)
Since we assume that the total system costs C are shared
among the users, we also have the equality:
C(`) :=
∑
h∈H
Ch(`
h) = SC(x) , (5)
with `h :=
∑
a,n x
h
na the total load at time h and ` := (`
h)h.
The efficiency of a mechanism is usually measured in game
theory by the ratio of the optimum social cost of the system
SC∗ := infx∈X SC(x) and the social cost of the worst Nash
Equilibrium:
Definition 1 ([10]): Price of Anarchy.
Given a game G and XNEG its set of Nash Equilibria, the
price of anarchy of G is given as:
PoA(G) :=
supx∈XNEG SC (x)
SC∗
. (6)
The notion of Price of Anarchy has been widely studied in
congestion and routing games (see [11],[12],[13]). Theoretical
bounds have been established in particular frameworks (e.g.
congestion games in [14],[15],[16]).
B. Fairness and Marginal Cost Pricing
To design a fair mechanism, the bill bn paid by each user
n should reflect the cost user n induces to the system, what
we call the externality of n. Precisely, we denote by:
C∗M := inf
(`m)m∈M
∑
h∈HCh
(∑
m∈M `
h
m
)
(7)
the optimal system cost that can be achieved with the users in
the set M while respecting their constraints. The externality
of user n is the difference between the optimal system cost
achieved with n in the population and the optimal system cost
that can be achieved without n, that is, Vn := C∗N − C∗N\{n}.
The quantity Vn is not necessarily proportional to the total
energy the user asks per day, as the load distribution between
peak and off-peak hours also impacts the system cost.
To be fair, the bill of user n should be proportional to Vn [8].
This motivates the introduction of the following mechanism:
bVCGn (xn,x−n) :=
∑
h∈H
Ch
(∑
m∈N
`hm
)
− C∗N\{n} (8)
which, as noticed in [17], corresponds to a Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism (VCG, see [18]). In particular, it minimizes
the system cost, which implies that in this model at an equi-
librium xNE we will have ∀n, bVCGn (xNE) = Vn. The authors
in [19] defined, in a more general framework, this pricing as
Marginal Cost Pricing, and showed (Prop. 3) that it is the
unique VCG mechanism that satisfies reasonable conditions.
However, the mechanism (8) does not recover the system
cost C∗N , and should be renormalized as bFn := b
VCG
n∑
m Vm
C∗N .
Although being centralized and hardly tractable, the billing
mechanism bFn is efficient (PoA=1) and fair (b
F
n ∝ Vn) and we
take it as a reference, following [20],[21], to define a fairness
measure of any billing mechanism:
Definition 2 ([21]): Fairness Index.
The fairness index of a billing mechanism (bn)n is its
maximal normalized distance to (Vn)n (or equivalently to
(bFn)n) at a Nash Equilibrium:
F := sup
x∈XNEG
[∑
n∈N
∣∣∣∣ Vn∑
m∈N Vm
− bn (x)∑
m∈N bm (x)
∣∣∣∣
]
. (9)
In [21], the authors notice the link between Vn and the
notion of Shapley Value ([22]) defined for cooperative games.
However, since the Shapley Value is given by a combinatorial
formula involving all possible coalitions within N , it becomes
quickly untractable as the cardinality of N grows. It is
therefore more appropriate to use (Vn)n as reference.
IV. DAILY PROPORTIONAL BILLING: SOCIAL OPTIMALITY
A. Daily Proportional (DP) billing: definition
In this section, we recall the standard billing mechanism of
[4]. Consumers share the total cost of the system proportion-
ally to their total consumption over the day. More precisely, if
we denote by En =
∑
a∈An Ena the total energy needed by
n, the bill of this user is:
bDPn (xn,x−n) =
En∑
m∈N Em
∑
h∈H
Ch(`
h) . (10)
B. Properties
As all users minimize SC(x) up to a constant factor, several
properties follow (detailed proofs are in [4]). First, [4, Thm. 1]
ensures that a Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists and, as cost
functions (Ch)h are assumed strictly convex, it is unique in
terms of aggregated load
(
`h
)
h
. The NE minimizes the social
cost SC ([4, Thm. 2]). In order to compute the NE in the
game, the authors in [4] consider the implementation of Best
Response Dynamic, that can be defined as follows:
Definition 3: Best Response Dynamic (BRD).
In BRD, at each iteration k, a user n is randomly chosen,
and solves his local optimization problem (3) with knowledge
of the load of others `(k−1)−n , taken as a parameter. The resulting
load `∗n is used to update `
(k)
n = `∗n and `
(k)
−n = `
(k−1)
−n .
In practice, we only need the aggregated load
∑
m6=n `
h
m to
solve user n’s problem, thus privacy of the users is preserved.
Again, due to the proportionality of the users objectives, the
BRD will converge to the NE ([4, Thm. 3]). Finally, [4,
Thm. 4] ensures that no user n can reduce his bill bn by giving
wrong information about his load (`hn)h during the process.
V. HOURLY PROPORTIONAL BILLING: FAIRNESS
A. Hourly Proportional (HP) billing: definition
Here, the total cost is divided between consumers at each
time period, according to the load they asked at this time
period. Intuitively, this enables to bring to each user the real
cost of its demand, in particular during peak hours. More
formally, the bill of user n is:
bHPn (xn,x−n) =
∑
h∈H
`hn∑
m∈N `hm
Ch(`
h) . (11)
This billing mechanism was already formulated in [8], [20],
[21]. In the latter, the authors show numerically that it is fairer
(according to indicator F (9)) than the payment (10).
B. Properties
With payments (11), the game G = (N ,X , (bHPn )n) has the
following properties.
Theorem 1: Let ch(`h) := 1`hCh(`
h) be the per-unit price
of electricity. If c′h > 0, i.e. prices are increasing with global
load, then a Nash Equilibirum exists. If, in addition:
∀h, (`
h)2∑
n(`
h
n)
2
>
(
`hc′′h(`
h)
2c′h(`h)
)2
(12)
then the Nash Equilibrium is unique.
Note that if the load is close to uniform, we have `
h
n
`h
' 1N
so `h2/
∑
`hn
2 ' N , and Assumption (12) is satisfied as soon
as the network has enough users. Thm. 1 is obtained as a
consequence of the results of Rosen [23] on the existence and
uniqueness of Nash Equilibria for N−persons concave games.
The main technical difficulty is to show the strict diagonal
convexity condition of Rosen. If we define the gradient of users
costs g(x) def= (∇nbn(x))n∈N , Rosen’s condition is equivalent
to having the Jacobian J(g)(x) definite positive for all x
admissible. We prove it by using a linear algebra perturbation
theorem. The details of the proof will be given elsewhere.
In general, the Nash Equilibrium does not achieve social
optimality. However, the following result provides a bound on
the Price of Anarchy (Def. 1).
Theorem 2: In the quadratic case (2) with no constant
coefficient (∀h, ah0 = 0), the price of anarchy is bounded:
PoA 6 1 + 3
4
sup
h∈H
1
1 + ah1/(a
h
2`
h
)
. (13)
The proof of this result relies on the property of local
smoothness introduced by Roughgarden and Schoppmann.
Definition 4 ([24]): Local smoothness.
A cost minimization game G = (N ,X , (bn)n) is locally
(λ, µ)-smooth with respect to y iff for all feasible outcome x:
∑
n∈N
bn(x) +∇nbn(x)T (yn − xn) 6 λSC(y) + µSC(x) .
The authors in [16] show that if G is locally (λ, µ)-smooth
with respect to an optimal outcome y, then the PoA is less or
equal than λ1−µ . In our case, with rh =
ah1
ah2 l
h , we prove that
the game is locally (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to any y with:
µ = sup
h
−1 +√1 + (1 + rh)2
(1 + rh)2
and λ = sup
h
(1 + rhµ)
2 + µ
4(1 + rh)µ
.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We compare numerically the billing mechanisms DP (10)
and HP (11), based on the two criterias of efficiency (Def. 1)
and fairness (Def. 2). We extracted a set N of 30 users from
the database PecanStreet Inc. ([25]), which gathers hundreds
of disaggregated residential consumption profiles in Texas,
U.S. We use hourly timesteps so that H = {0, 1, , ..., 23}.
We consider that each day, just before midnight, the flexible
consumption of each user for the next day is computed as
an equilibrium strategy of the game, implementing a BRD
algorithm as in Def. 3, using the Smart Grid for exchanging
the information `−n. We run simulations day by day on the
set of 30 days 1 D := {02/01/2016, . . . , 31/01/2016}.
A. Flexible Appliances: Electric Vehicles and Heating
We study a population of residential consumers owning
electric vehicles (EV) and electrical heating systems (furnace).
EVs present an important flexibility ([26]) since an EV re-
mains plugged in while it is parked, and a smart charging can
be automated without constraints for the user. Similarly, the
initial consumption profile of a heating system can be modified
without strong impact on the comfort of the household.
In our simulations, we consider a first case where EVs
are the only flexible appliances, accounting for 20.4% of
an average daily global energy of 1014kWh, and a second
case where furnaces are also considered as flexible appliances,
increasing the part of flexible energy to 25.8%. The remaining
of each user’s consumption is nonflexible, which we denote by
(ˆ`hn,NF)h (the hat stands for observed data values). Fig. 1(top)
shows the repartition between flexible and nonflexible load on
a typical day. The nonflexible load is more important on some
hours than others, so that even with hourly uniform system
costs (14), these hours will have bigger marginal costs.
The users constraints (1) are evaluated as follows: we
consider two types of days: D1 for weekdays (Monday to
Friday) and D2 for weekend days (Saturday and Sunday).
For each type Dk of day and each user n, we suppose that
appliance a can be used at h if it exists a day of type Dk
where a was on at h. More precisely, for a day of type
Dk, Hna =
⋃
d∈Dk{h : xd,ha > 0}. For simplicity, we
took the min power xhna equal to 0 and the max power x
h
na
equal to the maximal nonnegative value found on the data set
xhna = max
h,d∈H×D
xˆd,hna , if h ∈ Hna, and 0 otherwise.
1To start simulations with a working day, we dismissed January, 1st.
B. System Costs
We consider that the provider costs (Ch)h are functions of
the total load Lh := `hNF + `
h. More precisely, they are given
as Ch(`h) = C˜(Lh) where C˜ is given in dollar cents (¢) by:
∀h ∈ H, C˜h(Lh) = C˜(Lh) := 0.1+8Lh+0.04(Lh)2 . (14)
The average hourly nonflexible load on all days in D is:
〈ˆ`NF〉 := 1|D| × |H|
∑
d,h∈D×H
(∑
n∈N
xˆd,hn,NF
)
= 31.3kWh.
The coefficients in (14) are chosen arbitrarily but such that the
price Ch(〈ˆ`NF〉)/〈ˆ`NF〉 given by(14) match the price proposed
by the distributor CoServ [27] of 8.5¢/kWh for base contracts.
We assume that the nonflexible load (ˆ`hn,NF)h is billed in a
separate process (for instance, according to a baseline contract
as defined in the next subsection). We apply the proposed
billing mechanisms DP (10) and HP (11) on the flexible part
`h only. Although the system costs (C˜h)h are hourly uniform,
the variation in the nonflexible load `hNF over the hours induces
a variation on the cost of flexible load over the hours2:
∀h ∈ H, Ch(lh) := C˜(`hNF + `h)− C˜(`hNF)
= (8 + 0.08`hNF)`
h + 0.04(`h)
2
.
(15)
C. Two Reference Non-Game Theoretic Billing Models
In order to compare the formulated game-theoretic models
(10) and (11) to existent non game-theoretic billing models, we
also consider the two following standard models as references:
1) Baseline billing. No information on the global load is
sent to the users, who know a priori that they will pay a
fixed price per kWh p. Each user consumes energy without
any optimization of the system costs and we consider that the
consumption profile is given by the original (observed) profile
of each user (ˆ`hn)h.The bill of a user n with a total consumption
En =
∑
h
∑
a xˆ
h
na will be b
base
n (x) = b
base
n (xn) := p × En.
As both the PoA (6) and F (9) are normalized, the choice of
p has no influence at all on the values of those indicators.
2) Peak/Offpeak billing. This kind of contract already
exists in many countries and many of the Texas electricity
distributors are proposing it. The provider defines a priori a
fixed set of peak hours HP on which the prices are higher.
We consider that users avoid peak hours as soon as their
constraints enable it, by applying a simple greedy algorithm:
recursively, a random offpeak hour hoff is chosen and the
onpeak load of an appliance a is moved to hoff until xh
off
na is
reached. The resulting consumption profile is denoted by (˜`h)h
(see Fig. 1(bottom) for an example). In our simulations, we
define HP as the set of hours where the nonflexible load is the
higher on average, which gives HP = [7A.M.-9A.M.]∪ [5P.M.-
9P.M.]. We keep the same price ratio rpeak = ppeak/poff = 2.84
than the Texan distributor Coserv [27]. The bill of user n is:
bPeak/Offn (xn) := r
peakpoff
∑
h∈HP
˜`h
n + p
off
∑
h∈H\HP
˜`h
n . (16)
2In practice, the provider could rely on a forecast of `hNF for the next day
instead of the observed value ˆ`hNF, to compute the functions (Ch)h.
Fig. 1: Aggregated load of 30 users on January 10, 2016.
top: Observed profile from the data. bottom: The profile is
modified to avoid peak hours in the billing model (16).
Flexible Items EV only EV + furnace
Billing PoA-1 (%) F (%) PoA-1 (%) F (%)
HP 0.0830 (0.0772) 0.999 (0.286) 0.0886 (0.104) 1.17 (0.302)
DP 0.0 (0.0) 3.18 (1.38) 0 (0) 3.36 (1.57)
Baseline 18.8 (5.12) 3.19 (1.38) 18.5 (5.42) 3.36 (1.57)
Peak/Off 13.3 (3.17) 3.20 (1.34) 12.8 (3.69) 3.27 (1.04)
TABLE I: Mean (and standard deviation) of inefficiency
(PoA−1) and unfairness (F ) over the days D and users N .
As explained above, the choice of poff has no influence at all
on the value of the PoA and F . However, the ratio rpeak has
a direct impact on the fairness indicator (9).
D. Results
For each day in D, we obtain the equilibrium profile with
HP billing (11) by running the BRD (Def. 3). In most cases,
a hundred iterations (that is, around three optimizations of
(3) per user) were sufficient to converge to the equilibrium.
The optimal profile (corresponding to the equilibrium in DP)
is obtained as the solution of a quadratic program solved
with the solver Cplex 12.5. The simulations were imple-
mented in Python 3.5 and run on a single core IntelCore i7-
6600U@2.6Ghz with 7.7GB of RAM. The BRD process takes
around 50 seconds in average for each simulated day in D,
resulting in a total simulation time of around 20 minutes.
The inefficiency (PoA-1) and unfairness (F ) induced by the
four billing mechanisms, that is, DP (10), HP (11), baseline
billing and Peak/OffPeak billing (16), are represented in Fig. 4
for each day in D. The precise values (mean and variance) are
given in Tab. I. In practice, the PoA of HP is one up to 10−3:
this billing mechanism almost reaches the optimal social cost.
Fig. 2: Equilibrium profiles for DP (top) and HP (bottom),
on January 10, 2016. In DP, marginal costs are equal on all
hours if the flexible load is sufficient. The HP equilibrium
profile remains close to the optimal DP profile.
The equilibrium profile is not very far from the optimal load
profile. Fig. 2 shows the equilibria of the two mechanisms DP
(optimal) an HP. The optimal load profile is very flat. Indeed,
due to Kuhn-Tucker conditions of optimality, marginal costs
are equal on all hours where constraints (1b) are not tight.
Therefore, if the part of flexible load is large enough, the total
load Lh will be the same for all hours. The equilibrium of
the mechanism HP is not as flat, but it remains close to the
optimal profile, due to its limited PoA.
Because of the absence of coordination among users in the
non-game theoretic Peak/OffPeak billing mechanism, some
offpeak hours become congested, as seen on Fig. 1(bottom),
resulting in high system costs. This efficiency loss is avoided
by using a gaming mechanism as HP and DP.
We can see both from Fig. 4 and Tab. I that the HP mech-
anism achieves an important fairness property in comparison
with the other mechanisms. The associated standard deviation
of F of 0.3% indicates that its fairness is also more robust than
the other models. Indeed, Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the
indicator F when we relax the constraint of max power (1b)
by scaling the value xhna chosen in Section VI-A by a factor
in [0.5, 3]. The unfairness induced by DP decreases when the
constraints are relaxed, and it gets closer and closer to HP.
Therefore, the HP mechanism will be much more interesting
when the constraints are tight.
Fig. 3: Evolution of unfairness in HP and DP with constraints.
When constraints (1b) are tight, the DP mechanism has a large
unfairness and gets fairer when the constraints are relaxed.
Fig. 4: Comparison of billing mechanisms on the 30 days in
D with EV charging considered as flexible. HP has a PoA of
one up to 10−3. The non-game theoretic billings Baseline and
Peak/Offpeak are dominated on average. Results are similar
when we also consider heating as a flexible appliance.
VII. CONCLUSION
We gave theoretical results ensuring that the hourly propor-
tional billing mechanism has a unique equilibrium and that
its price of anarchy is bounded. Experimental results revealed
that this mechanism achieves an important fairness property
with our quantitative indicator (9), while being very close to
the social optimum (up to 0.08%). We have seen that the
fairness indicator of the hourly mechanism was three times
smaller than the other mechanisms, associated with a low
variance. As this fairness difference increases with the level
of constraints, using the hourly mechanism in practice will be
really interesting if the consumption is highly constrained. If
we consider some utility functions in each user optimization
(as in [17]), the daily proportional billing mechanism has no
reason to conserve its property of social optimality. Therefore,
the small efficiency loss of the hourly mechanism should not
have any influence in practice.
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